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Abstract
Explainable planning is widely accepted as a pre-
requisite for autonomous agents to successfully
work with humans. While there has been a lot of
research on generating explanations of solutions to
planning problems, explaining the absence of solu-
tions remains an open and under-studied problem,
even though such situations can be the hardest to
understand or debug. In this paper, we show that
hierarchical abstractions can be used to efficiently
generate reasons for unsolvability of planning prob-
lems. In contrast to related work on computing cer-
tificates of unsolvability, we show that these meth-
ods can generate compact, human-understandable
reasons for unsolvability. Empirical analysis and
user studies show the validity of our methods as
well as their computational efficacy on a number
of benchmark planning domains.
1 Introduction
The ability to explain the rationale behind a decision is widely
seen as one of the basic skills needed by an autonomous agent
to truly collaborate with humans. At the very least we would
want our autonomous teammates to be capable of explaining
why a particular action/plan was chosen to achieve some ob-
jective and be able to explain why they consider some objec-
tives to be unachievable. For example, consider an automated
taxi scheduling system. A user asks for a taxi to pick up her
and three of her friends and the service comes back by say-
ing that it is not possible, and recommends instead using two
different taxis. In this scenario, the user would want to know
why a single taxi can’t pick up all four of them.
Most earlier works in explanation generation for planning
problems have focused on the problem of explaining why a
given plan or action was chosen, but do not address the prob-
lem of explaining the unsolvability of a given planning prob-
lem. While works like [Eriksson, Ro¨ger, and Helmert, 2018;
Eriksson, Ro¨ger, and Helmert, 2017] have looked at the prob-
lem of generating certificates or proofs of unsolvability, these
certificates are geared towards automatic verification rather
than human understandability.
In this paper, we present a new approach for explaining
unsolvability of planning problems that builds on the well
known psychological insight that humans tend to decompose
sequential planning problems in terms of the subgoals they
need to achieve [Donnarumma, Maisto, and Pezzulo, 2016;
Cooper and Shallice, 2006; Simon and Newell, 1971]. We
will thus help the user understand the infeasibility of a given
planning problem by pointing out unreachable but necessary
subgoals. For example, in the earlier case, “Holding three pas-
sengers” is a subgoal that is required to reach the goal, but
one that can no longer be achieved due to new city regula-
tions. Thus the system could explain that the taxi can’t hold
more than two passenger at a time (and also notify the user
about the new city ordinance).
Unfortunately, this is not so straightforward, since by the
very nature of the problem, there exist no solutions and hence
no direct way of extracting meaningful subgoals for the prob-
lem. We can find a way around this issue by noting the fact
that the user is asking for an explanation for unsolvability ei-
ther due to a lack of understanding of the task or because of
limitations in their inferential capabilities. Therefore, we can
try to capture the user’s expectations by considering abstrac-
tions of the given problem. In particular, we use state abstrac-
tions to generate potential solutions and subgoals at higher
levels of abstractions. Such an approach was used by [Sreed-
haran, Srivastava, and Kambhampati, 2018] to compute ex-
planations for user queries attuned to the level of expertise of
the user.
In section 3, we present our basic framework and discuss
how we can identify the appropriate level of abstraction and
unachievable subgoals for an unsolvable classical planning
problem. In the real world, a more challenging version of this
problem arises when the user provides plan advice (which
may include temporal preferences) on the type of solutions
expected. In section 4, we will see how explaining unsolv-
ability of planning problems with plan advice (c.f [Myers,
1996]) could be seen as establishing unsolvability of planning
problems with additional plan constraints. This is a capabil-
ity that is necessary to capture the fact that these explanations
are being provided within the context of a conversation. The
presence of these additional plan advice could either reflect
cases (1) where the original problem was solvable, but users
requirements (i.e. expressed in the advice) renders it unsolv-
able and (2) where the original problem was unsolvable and
the user presents an outline for a solution in the form of ad-
vice. Even in the second case, by taking into account the hu-
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Figure 1: A sample abstraction lattice. The lattice consists of mod-
els generated by projecting out rocks or soil samples. The problem is
unsolvable (the goal is marked in green) in the most concrete model
but solvable in models where the rocks are projected out.
man’s expected solution, we can provide a more targeted ex-
planation. For evaluating our approach, we will look at a user
study we ran to validate the usefulness of such explanations
for unsolvable problems (with plan advice) and also note the
computational efficiency of our method for some standard
planning benchmarks.
2 Background
We will assume that the autonomous agent uses a STRIPS
planning model [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971] that can be repre-
sented as a tuple of the formM = 〈F,A, I,G〉, where F is
a set of propositional fluents that define the state space SM
for the model, A gives the set of actions the robot has access
to, I defines the initial state and G the goal. A state S ∈ SM
corresponds to a unique value assignment for each state flu-
ent and can be represented by the set of fluents that are true
in that state. Each action a ∈ A is further defined by a tuple
a = 〈preca, addsa, delsa〉 and a plan is defined as an action
sequence of the form pi = 〈a1, ..., an〉. A plan is said to be
valid for M, if the result of executing a plan from the ini-
tial state satisfies the goal (denoted as pi(I) |=M G). For the
modelM, we will represent the set of all valid plans as ΠM.
Each planning modelM also corresponds to a transition sys-
tem T = 〈SM, I, SG, A, T 〉, where SG is the subset of SM
where the goal G is satisfied and T ⊆ SM × A × SM, such
that 〈S, a, S′〉 ∈ T (denoted as S a−→ S′) if a(S) = S′. Each
valid plan has a corresponding path in the transition system
from I to some state in SG.
In this work, we will be focusing on state and action ab-
stractions induced by projecting out fluents. Thus a model
M2 is said to be an abstraction of M1 (denoted by M1 v
M2) if modelM2 can be formed fromM1 by projecting out
a set of fluents. Formally, M1 v M2 if there exists some
P ⊆ F , such that the transition system of M2 is defined
as T2 = 〈SM2 , I2,SG2 , A, T2〉. Where, for every S ∈ SM1 ,
there exist a state S \ P ∈ SM2 , I2 = I \ P , SG2 is the
subset of SM2 that satisfy G′ = G \ P and for every transi-
tion 〈S, a, S′〉 ∈ T1, there exist 〈S \ P, a, S′ \ P 〉 ∈ T2. We
will denote an abstraction formed by projecting out P from
the model M as fP (M). An abstraction fP (M) is consid-
ered logically complete if for every pi such that pi(I) |=M G,
we have pi(IfP (M)) |=fP (M) GfP (M). In this work, we will
only be looking at logically complete abstractions. For clas-
sical planning models, logically complete abstractions can be
formed by simply removing the abstracted out fluents from
the domain model and problem.
Sreedharan, Srivastava, and Kambhampati (2018) notes
that given a modelM and a set of propositions P we can de-
fine an abstraction lattice, denoted as L = 〈M,E, `〉, where
each model in M is an abstraction ofM. There exist an edge
〈M1,M2〉 ∈ E with label `(M1,M2) = p, if f{p}(M1) =
M2. For convenience, we will treat the abstraction function f
for a given lattice as invertible and use f−1P (M) to represent
the unique concrete node in the lattice that could have been
abstracted (by projecting out P ) to generateM. We will re-
fer to f−1P (M) as the concretization of M for P . Figure 1
presents a simple conceptualization of an abstraction lattice
for the rover domain. The edges in the lattice correspond to
projecting out the presence of rocks or soil samples.
These earlier work uses such abstraction lattices to esti-
mate the user’s level of understanding of the given task, by
searching for the level of abstraction where an incorrect alter-
native raised by the user (or foil) could be supported. In the
following section, we will layout our framework and discuss
how we leverage the abstraction lattice for our purposes.
3 Our Approach
The input to our approach includes an unsolvable problem
MR = 〈FR, AR, IR, GR〉 (i.e |ΠMR | = 0) and an abstrac-
tion lattice L = 〈M,E, `〉, where M represents the space of
possible models that could be used to capture the human’s
understanding of the task. Given this setting, our method for
identifying explanations, includes the following steps
• Identify the level of abstraction at which the explanation
should be provided (Section 3.1)
• Identify a sequence of necessary subgoals for the given
problem that can be reasoned about at the identified level
of abstraction (Section 3.2)
• Identify the first unachievable subgoal in that sequence
(Section 3.3)
Intuitively, one could understand the three steps mentioned
above as follows. First, identify the level of detail at which un-
solvability of the problem needs to be discussed. The higher
the level of abstraction, the easier the user would find it to un-
derstand and reason about the task, but the level of abstraction
should be detailed enough that the problem is actually unsolv-
able there. In most cases, this would mean finding the highest
level of abstraction where the problem is still unsolvable.
Now even if the system was to present the problem at this
desired level of abstraction, the user may be unable to grasp
the reason for unsolvability. Again, our method involves help-
ing the human in this process by pointing out a necessary
subgoal (i.e., any valid solution to that problem must achieve
the subgoal) that can’t be achieved at the current abstraction
level. Thus the second point relates to the challenge of finding
a sequence of subgoals (defined by state fluents present at the
explanatory level) for a given problem. In the third step, we
try to identify the first subgoal in the sequence that is actually
unsolvable in the given level.
Given our approach, the final explanatory message pro-
vided to the user would include model information that brings
their understanding of the task to the required level and infor-
mation on the specific subgoals (and previous ones that need
to be achieved first) that can no longer be achieved. In cases
where the unachievable subgoals are hard to understand for-
mulas or large disjunctions, we can also use these subgoals to
produce exemplar plans and illustrate their failures alongside
the unachievable subgoals.
3.1 Identifying the Minimal Level of Abstraction
Required for Explanation
Let’s assume that the human’s understanding of the task could
be approximated by a model MH = 〈FH , AH , IH , GH〉,
such that, the model is part of the abstraction lattice (MR @
MH andMH ∈M) and since the user expected the problem
to be solvable,MH is such that ∃pi, pi(IMH ) |=MH GMH ,
i.e pi ∈ ΠMH .
We now need to this human model to an abstraction level
where the problem is unsolvable (i.e the explanation level) by
providing information about a certain subset of fluents previ-
ously missing from the human model (i.e information on their
truth values in the initial and goal state, and how they affect
various actions etc...).
For example, in the case of Figure 1, let us assume that
the human model is M2, then the information that needs to
be provided to the user involves the position of the rocks
and how they restrict certain robot motions. We will refer
to the set of fluents that the human needs to be informed
about as explanatory fluents (E) and for Figure 1, it will be
E = {has rocks(?x, ?y)}.
Definition 1. Given a human model MH , we define a set
of propositions E to be explanatory fluents if f−1E (MH) is
unsolvable, i.e, |Πf−1E (MH)| = 0.
Unfortunately, this is not an operational definition as we
do not have access toMH . Instead, we know thatMH must
be part of the lattice, and thus there exists a subset of the
maximal elements of the lattice (denoted as Mabs)1 that is
more abstract thanMH . In this section, we will show how the
explanatory fluents for models in this subset of Mabs would
satisfyMH as well.
The first useful property to keep in mind is that if M1 is
more concrete than M2 then the models obtained by con-
cretizing each model with the same set of fluents would main-
tain this relation (although they may get concretized to the
same model), i.e.,
Proposition 1. Given models M1, M2 and a set of fluents
′, ifM1 vM2, then f−1′ (M1) v f−1′ (M2) .
1w.l.o.g we assume the existence of a set of maximal elements
instead of a unique supremum as these lattices need not be complete.
Next, it can be shown that any given set of explanatory
fluents for an abstract model will be a valid explanatory fluent
set for a more concrete model
Proposition 2. Given modelsM1,M2, ifM1 v M2, then
any explanation E for M2 must also be an explanation for
M1.
To see why this proposition is true, let’s start from the
fact that f−1E (M1) v f−1E (M2) and therefore Πf−1E (M1) ⊆
Πf−1E (M2). From the definition of explanation we know that
the concretization with respect to explanatory fluents would
render the problem unsolvable (i.e |Πf−1E (M2)| = 0) and thus|Πf−1E (M1))| must also be empty and hence E is an explana-
tion forM1.
Definition 2. Given an abstraction lattice L, let Mabs be its
maximal elements. Then the minimum abstraction set is de-
fined as Mmin = {M|M ∈Mabs ∧ |ΠM| > 0}.
Note that for any modelM1 ∈ Mmin,MH v M1, this
means by Proposition 2, any explanation that is valid for mod-
els in Mmin, should leadMH to a node where the problem
is unsolvable. Now we can generate the explanation (even
the optimal one) by searching for a set of fluents that when
introduced to the models M ∈ Mmin will render resulting
f−1E (M) unsolvable.
3.2 Generating Subgoals of a Given Problem
Note that we can’t identify possible subgoals for the given
problem in the node at which the problem was found to be
unsolvable (i.e f−1E (Mmin)). There exist no valid plans in
that model and thus there are no subgoals to point to. For-
tunately, we can use models more abstract than f−1E (Mmin)
to generate such subgoals. We will use planning landmarks
[Hoffmann, Porteous, and Sebastia, 2004] extracted fromM,
where |ΠM| > 0, as subgoals. Intuitively, state landmarks
(denoted as Λ = 〈Φ,≺〉) for a modelM can be thought of as
a partially ordered set of formulas, where the formulas and the
ordering needs to be satisfied by every plan that is valid inM.
We will only be considering sound orderings (c.f [Richter,
Helmert, and Westphal, 2008]) between landmarks, namely,
(1) natural orderings (≺nat) - φ ≺nat φ′, then φ must be true
before φ′ is made true in every plan, (2) necessary orderings
(≺nec) - if φ ≺nec φ′ then φ must be true in the step before
φ′ is made true every time and (3) greedy necessary orderings
(≺gnec) - if φ ≺gnec φ′ then φ must be true in the step before
φ′ is made true the first time. The landmark formulas may be
disjunctive, conjunctive or atomic landmarks.
Our use of landmarks as the way to identify subgoals is fur-
ther justified by the fact that logically complete abstractions
conserve landmarks. Formally
Proposition 3. Given two models M1 and M2, such that
M1 v M2, let Λ1 = 〈Φ1,≺1〉 and Λ2 = 〈Φ2,≺2〉 be the
landmarks ofM1 andM2 respectively. Then for all φ1i , φ1j ∈
Φ1, such that φ1i 1 φ1j (where ≺1 is some sound ordering),
we have φ2i and φ
2
j in Φ2, where φ
1
i 2 φ1j , φ1i |= φ2i and
φ1j |= φ2j .
This is true because φ2i ≺1 φ2j hold over all the plans that
are valid in M2, thus must also hold over all plans in M1.
Though in M1 these landmark instances may be captured
by more constrained formulas and additionallyM1 may also
contain landmarks that were absent fromM2. Now if we can
show that in a particular model, a landmark generated from a
more abstract model is unachievable (or the ordering from the
previous level is unachievable) then φ1∗ becomes ⊥ (thereby
meeting the above requirement). Thereafter for any model
more concrete than M2, the formula corresponding to that
landmark must be ⊥. In other words, if for any model a land-
mark is unachievable, then that landmark can’t be achieved in
any models more concrete than the current one.
So given the explanatory level, we can move one level up
in the lattice and make use of any of the well established
landmark extraction methods developed for classical plan-
ning problem to generate a sequence of potential subgoals for
MR.
3.3 Identifying Unachievable Sub-Goals
Now we need to find the first subgoal from the sequence that
can no longer be achieved in the models obtained by apply-
ing the explanatory fluents ( f−1E (Mmin)) which will then
be presented to the user. For example, in the case of Figure
1, the unachievable subgoal would correspond to satisfying
at rover(5, 4) (marked in red in M4).
It is important to note that finding the first unachievable
subgoal is not as simple as testing the achievability of each
subgoal at the abstraction level identified by methods dis-
cussed in section 3.1. Instead, we need to make sure that
each subgoal is achievable while preserving the order of all
the previous subgoals. To test this we will introduce a new
compilation that allows us to express the problem of testing
achievement of a landmark formula as a planning problem.
Consider a planning modelM and the landmarks Λ = 〈Φ,≺〉
extracted from some model M′, where M @ M′. We will
assume that the formulas in Φ are propositional logic for-
mulas over the state fluents and are expressed in DNF. Each
φ ∈ Φ can be represented as a set of sets of fluents (i.e, φ =
{c1, ..., ck} and each ci set takes the form ci = {p1, ..pm}),
where each set of fluents represent a conjunction over those
fluents. For testing the achievability of any landmark φ ∈ Φ,
we make an augmented model Mφ = 〈Fφ, Aφ, Iφ, Gφ〉,
such that the landmark is achievable iff |ΠMφ | > 0. The
model Mφ can be defined as follows: Fφ = F ∪ Fmeta,
where Fmeta contains new meta fluents for each possible
landmark φ′ ∈ Φ of the form
• achieved(φ′) keeps track of a landmark being achieved
and never gets removed
• unset(φ′) Says that the landmark has not been achieved
yet, usually set true in the initial state unless the land-
mark is true in the initial state
• first time achieved(φ′) Says that the landmark has
been achieved for the first time. This fluent is set true
in the initial state if the landmark is already true there
The new action set Aφ, will contain a copy of each action
in A. For each new action corresponding to a ∈ A, we add
the following new effects to track the achievement of each
landmark
• for each φ′ ∈ Φ if the action has existing add effects for
a subset of predicates cˆj for a cj ∈ φ′, then we add the
conditional effects cond1(φ′) → {achieved(φ′)} and
cond2(φ
′)→ {first time achieved(φ′)}, where
cond1(φ
′) = cj \ cˆj ∪ {φˆ|φˆ ∈ Φ ∧ (φˆ ≺nec φ′)} ∪
{achieved(φˆ)|φˆ ≺nat φ′} and
cond2(φ
′) = cond1(φ′)∪{φˆ|φˆ ≺gnec φ′}∪{unset(φ)}
• We add a conditional delete effect to every ac-
tion of the form first time achieved(φ′) →
(not(first time achieved(φ′)))
The new goal would be defined as Gφ =
{first time achieved(φ)}.
This formulation allows us to test each landmark in the
given sequence and find the first one that can no longer be
achieved. To ensure completeness, we will return the final
goal if all the previously extracted landmarks are still achiev-
able in f−1E (Mmin). Since the above formulation is designed
for DNF, we can generate compilation for cases where the
landmarks use either un-normalized formulas or CNF by con-
verting them first into DNF formulas. Readers can find sam-
ple explanations generated using our methods in the supple-
mentary file hosted at https://goo.gl/nc2NP3.
4 Planning Problem with Plan Advice
Let us now discuss how we could extend the methods pre-
sented in earlier sections to cases where the user provides plan
advice. In such cases,the user imposes certain restrictions on
the kind of solution they expect, either as an alternative to
the solution the system may come up with on its own or as
a guide to help the system come up with solutions when it
claims unsolvability.
As pointed out in [Myers, 1996], such advice can be
compiled into plan constraints in the original problem. A
number of approaches have been proposed to capture and
represent plan constraints [Bacchus and Kabanza, 2000;
Nau et al., 2001; Kambhampati, Knoblock, and Yang, 1995;
Baier and McIlraith, 2006], and each of these representational
choices has its unique strengths and weaknesses. In general,
we can see that these plan constraints specify a partitioning of
the space of all valid plans to either acceptable (i.e it satisfies
the constraints) or unacceptable. So we can define, constraints
as follows
Definition 3. A constraint σ for a planning modelM, speci-
fies a function that maps a set of valid plans onM to a subset,
σ : 2ΠM → 2ΠM , such that, σ(ΠM) ⊆ Π.
If we can assume some upper bound on the possible length
of plans in σ(ΠM) (which is guaranteed when we restrict our
attention to non-redundant plans in any function free frag-
ment of classical planning), then we can assert that there al-
ways exists a finite state machine that captures the space of
acceptable plans
Proposition 4. Given a constraint σ, there exists a finite state
automaton Fσ = 〈Σ,SFσ , S0, δ, E〉, where Σ is the input
alphabet, SFσ defines the FSA states, S0 is the initial state, δ
is the transition function and E is the set of accepting states,
such that σ(ΠM) = L(Fσ) ∩ ΠM, where L(Fσ) is the set
of strings accepted by Fσ .
The existence of Fσ can be trivially shown by considering
an FSA that has a path for each unique plan inFσ . We believe
that this formulation is general enough to capture almost all
of the plan constraint specifications discussed in the planning
literature, including LTL based specifications, since for clas-
sical planning problems these formulas are better understood
in terms of LTLf [De Giacomo and Vardi, 2015] which can
be compiled into a finite state automaton.
We can useFσ to build a new model σ(M) such that a plan
is valid in σ(M) if and only if the plan is valid for M and
satisfies the given specification σ, i.e., ∀pi, pi ∈ Πσ(M) iff pi ∈
σ(ΠM)
For M = 〈F,A, I,G〉, we can define the new model
σ(M) = 〈Fσ, Aσ, Iσ, Gσ〉 as follows
• Fσ = F ∪ {in-state-{S}|S ∈ SFσ}
• Aσ = A ∪Aδ
• Iσ = I ∪ {in-state-{S0}}
• Gσ = G ∪ {in-state-{S}|S ∈ E}
Aδ are the new meta actions responsible for simu-
lating the transitions defined by δ : SFσ × Σ →
pow(SFσ ). For example, if δ(S1, a) = {S1, S2}, where
a corresponds to an action in A, then we will have two
new actions a1S1,a = 〈preca ∪ {in-state-{S1}}, addsa ∪
{in-state-{S2}}, delsa ∪ {in-state-{S1}}〉 and a2S1,a =
〈preca ∪ {in-state-{S1}}, addsa, delsa}〉. In cases like LTL,
the FSA state transitions may be induced by the satisfaction
of some formula, so the new meta action may have precondi-
tions corresponding to that formula, with no other effects but
changing the fluent corresponding to the state transition.
The above formulation merely points out that there always
exists a way of generating σ(M) from the given specification
σ and M. For many constraint types, there may exist more
efficient ways of generating models that satisfy the require-
ments of σ(M).
Once we have access to σ(M), we should be able to use the
methods discussed in earlier sections, provided we can show
that these new models could be used to build an abstraction
lattice. In particular, we want to know if the abstraction rela-
tions are preserved. Fortunately this is true. Formally,
Proposition 5. Given models M1, M2 and a constraint
specification σ, ifM1 vM2, then σ(M1) v σ(M2).
To see why this is true, just assume that the reverse was
true, that σ(M2) is not a logically complete abstraction of
σ(M1). This means that there are plans in Πσ(M1) that are
not part of Πσ(M2). From the definition of σ(M2), we know
that Πσ(M2) = ΠM2 ∩ L(Fσ). If there exist a pi ∈ Πσ(M1),
such that pi 6∈ Πσ(M2), then pi 6∈ ΠM2 . Which meansM1 6vM2, hence contradicting our assumptions.
5 Evaluations
5.1 User Studies
Our first topic for evaluation is whether explanations based
on landmarks do, in fact, constitute meaningful explanations,
at least for naive users. As a simple alternative, we enumer-
ated over a set of solutions (generated from a higher level of
abstraction) and pointed out their individual failures. For the
study, we recruited around 120 master turkers from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk and tested the following hypotheses
• H1 - Users prefer explanations concise explanations
over ones that enumerate a set of possible candidates for
a given piece of plan advice
• H2 - Users prefer concise explanations that contain in-
formation about unachievable landmarks over ones that
only show the failure of a single exemplary plan
For the hypotheses, we presented the study participants with
a sample dialogue between two people over a logistics plan to
move a package from one location to another. The dialogue
included a person (named Bob) presenting a plan to another
(named Alice), and Alice asks for an alternative possibility
(i.e specifies a constraint on the solution). Now the challenge
for Bob is to explain why the constrained problem is unsolv-
able.
For H1, the potential explanations included (a) just infor-
mation on the unachievable landmark, (b) landmark informa-
tion with the failure details of a specific exemplary plan and
(c) a set of three plans that satisfy the constraints and their
corresponding failures. For this study, we used 45 partici-
pants and each participant was assigned one of three possible
maps for each hypothesis and was paid $1.25 for 10 mins.
We used a control question to filter participant responses, so
as to ensure their quality. Out of the 39 remaining responses,
we found 94.8% of users chose to select the more concise
explanation (i.e (a) or (b)), and 51.28% of the users chose
explanations that involved just landmarks.
For H2, we used 75 participants and presented each par-
ticipant with explanations that include (a) just landmark in-
formation, (b) landmark information with failure details of
an exemplary plan and (c) just the exemplary plan failure.
Here participants were paid $1 for 10 mins for H2 as the ex-
planatory options were much simpler. After filtering using
the control question, we found that out of 60 valid entries
75.4% of participants preferred explanations that included
landmark information ((a) or (b)) and 44.2% wanted both
landmarks and exemplary plan (i.e (b)). The supplementary
file at https://goo.gl/nc2NP3 contains more details
on the study setup.
5.2 Empirical Studies
In this section, we will present the results of an empirical
evaluation of the computational charecteristics of our ap-
proach. One big concern with the methods discussed in this
work is the fact that they involve solving multiple planning
problems. Thus we were interested in identifying how the
runtime for an explanation would change when the lattice size
changed. As a baseline for comparison we use the trivialized
problem where the agent must compute an explanation for a
user whose model is known, which means the corresponding
search space is much smaller (the supremum of the lattice will
be the unique human model).
We considered five standard IPC domains and generated a
stand-in for the human model by projecting out a random sub-
set of state fluents. Next, we chose five problem instances for
each of the domains and recorded the time required to gener-
ate explanations for the human model versus a case where the
Domain Name
Uknown Human Model Known Human Model
lattice size Explanation Cost Average Runtime (secs) lattice size Explanation Cost Average Runtime (secs)
Elevator 8 3.4 0.772 3 3.4 0.529
Blocksworld 4 11.6 8.141 2 11.6 14.77
Satellite 8 6.5 8.586 4 6.5 5.18
Depots 5 13 20.229 3 12 44.920
Rover 10 3.8 365.287 5 3.8 338.944
Figure 2: Table showing runtime for explanations generated for standard IPC domains. The explanation costs capture the number of unique
model updates (changes in effects/precondition etc..) corresponding to each explanation
model was unknown. We simulated the latter case by consid-
ering a complete abstraction lattice generated from a superset
of the fluents that the human is actually unaware of. For each
of the five domains, the total number of fluents used to gen-
erate the lattice for the unknown case was at least twice the
original number of fluents that was missing from the human
model. Each problem instance was made unsolvable by in-
cluding plan constraints that avoid a specific landmark of the
original problem. The constraints were coded using domain
control programs of the type discussed in [Baier, Fritz, and
McIlraith, 2007]. The constraints ensures that plans avoid one
of the landmarks of the original problem, thereby rendering it
unsolvable.
Figure 2, shows the average runtime and cost of explana-
tions (the number of model updates corresponding to an ex-
planation) related to each domain. We can see that the con-
ciseness of the explanations does not suffer when the user
model is not known! For most domains, the total runtime is
quite comparable between the two cases, with the unknown
case performing better in some domains. This is due to the
fact that in the unknown case the test for solvability is usually
carried out in more abstract models.
6 Related Work
As mentioned, there has been prior work on generating plan-
ner independent certificates or proofs for establishing the un-
solvability of a given planning problem. Another related di-
rection, has been the effort to generate “excuses” for un-
solvability of a planning problem [Go¨belbecker et al., 2010;
Herzig et al., 2014]. They do not provide an intuitive expla-
nation as to why a problem is unsolvable, but rather identifies
initial state values (or some domain model conditions) whose
update could make the problem solvable.
The contrastive explanations of the type studied in [Sreed-
haran, Srivastava, and Kambhampati, 2018], where the user
presents an alternative plans (that are then refuted by the sys-
tem) can be thought of as a special case of our approach for
problems with plan advice. The problems studied in that ear-
lier paper can be thought about cases where the advice only
allows a single plan. Also, one could argue that people would
be more comfortable giving advices than full plans.
Part of our explanations also try to reveal to the user infor-
mation about the current task that was previously unknown to
them. Thus our methods could also be understood as an ex-
ample of explanation as model-reconciliation [Chakraborti et
al., 2017]. Since our methods use abstractions, our approach
doesn’t make too many demands on the inferential capabili-
ties of the user and hence can be applied to much larger and
more complex domains.
Another closely related direction has been the work done
on explaining unsynthesizability of hybrid controllers for a
given set of high-level task specifications [Raman and Kress-
Gazit, 2013]. The work tries to identify the subformulas of
the given specification that lead to the unsynthesizability.
This particular approach is specific to the planning frame-
work detailed in [Finucane, Jing, and Kress-Gazit, 2010] and
the objective of the work parallels the goals of work like
[Go¨belbecker et al., 2010; Herzig et al., 2014].
Outside of explanation generation, the work done in the
model checking community is closely related to our current
problem [Grumberg and Veith, 2008]. In fact, the hierarchical
approach to identifying a model that can invalidate the given
foil specification, can be seen as a special case of the CE-
GAR based methods studied in the model-checking commu-
nity [Clarke et al., 2000]. Most work in this field focuses on
developing methods for identifying whether a given program
meets some specifications and failures to meet specification
are generally communicated via counterexamples.
7 Discussion and Future Directions
The work discussed in this paper investigates the problem of
generating explanations for unsolvability of a given planning
problem. We also saw how the same methods apply when
dealing with problems with plan constraints. In addition to
extending these methods to more expressive domains, an in-
teresting extension would be to try tackling cases where the
current problem is solvable but all the solutions are too ex-
pensive. While this additional cost threshold could be seen as
a constraint, the setting becomes a lot more interesting when
the action costs are affected by the abstractions (c.f state de-
pendent costs [Geißer, Keller, and Mattmu¨ller, 2016]). With
respect to contrastive explanations, this would correspond to
cases where the alternative posed by the user is more expen-
sive than the plan proposed by the robot.Finally, an obvious
challenge to fully realize this method in practical scenarios
is to develop methods to convert user questions to plan con-
straints. Methods like [Tenorth et al., 2010] can be used to
convert natural language statements to constraints like partial
plans. Expert users can also directly write LTL and procedu-
ral programs as a way of interrogating the system.
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